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Abstract
We develop a model of issue-specific voting behavior. This model can be used
to explore lawmakers’ personal voting patterns of voting by issue area, providing an
exploratory window into how the language of the law is correlated with political sup-
port. We derive approximate posterior inference algorithms based on variational meth-
ods. Across 12 years of legislative data, we demonstrate both improvement in heldout
prediction performance and the model’s utility in interpreting an inherently multi-
dimensional space.
Key words: Item response theory, Probabilistic topic model, Variational inference, Legislative
voting
1. INTRODUCTION
Legislative behavior centers around the votes made by lawmakers. These votes are captured
in roll call data, a matrix with lawmakers in the rows and proposed legislation in the columns.
We illustrate a sample of roll call votes for the United States Senate in Figure 1.
The seminal work of Poole and Rosenthal (1985) introduced the ideal point model, using
roll call data to infer the latent political positions of the lawmakers. The ideal point model
is a latent factor model of binary data and an application of item-response theory (Lord
1980) to roll call data. It gives each lawmaker a latent political position along a single
dimension and then uses these points (called the ideal points) in a model of the votes. (Two
lawmakers with the same position will have the same probability of voting in favor of each
bill.) From roll call data, the ideal point model recovers the familiar division of Democrats
and Republicans. See Figure 2 for an example.
Ideal point models can capture the broad political structure of a body of lawmakers, but
they cannot tell the whole story. We illustrate this with votes on a bill in Figure 3. This
figure shows lawmaker’s ideal points for their votes on an act Recognizing the significant
accomplishments of AmeriCorps, H.R. 1338 in Congress 111. In this figure, “Yea” votes are
colored orange, while “Nay” votes are violet; a classic ideal point model predicted that votes
Example roll call votes
Lawmaker Item of legislation
Bill S. 3930 H.R. 5631 H.R. 6061 H.R. 5682 S. 3711
Mitch McConnell (R) Yea Yea Yea Yea Yea
Olympia Snowe (R) Yea Yea Yea Nay
John McCain (R) Yea Yea Yea Yea Yea
Patrick Leahy (D) Nay Yea Nay Nay Nay
Paul Sarbanes (D) Nay Yea Nay Yea Nay
Debbie Stabenow (D) Yea Yea Yea Yea Yea
Figure 1: A sample roll-call matrix illustrating lawmakers’ votes on items of legislation.
These votes are from the Senate in the 109th Congress (2005-2006). The party of each
Senator – (D)emocrat or (R)epublican – is provided in parentheses. This matrix is sometimes
incomplete (see Snowe’s vote on S. 3930, for example).
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Figure 2: Traditional ideal points separate Republicans (red) from Democrats (blue).
−4 −2 0 2 4
Incorrect votes by classic ideal point
−4 −2 0 2 4
Incorrect votes by issue-adjusted ideal point
Figure 3: Classic ideal points (top) represent votes incorrectly when lawmakers hold issue-
specific opinions, while issue-adjusted ideal points (bottom) can account for this. Classic
ideal points assume that lawmakers hold fixed positions, while issue-adjusted ideal points
allow their positions to change by issue. Each point above is the ideal point of a lawmaker
voting on an act Recognizing the significant accomplishments of AmeriCorps [and raising
community service] (H.R. 1338 in Congress 111); orange points represent lawmakers who
voted “Yea”, and violet points represent lawmakers who voted “Nay” on this bill. The
theory behind classic ideal points assumes that lawmakers’ votes on a bill can be described
by their side of the cut point (black vertical line). Red lines mark lawmakers whose votes
were incorrectly predicted with each model.
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to the right of the vertical line were “Nay” while those to the left were “Yea”. Out of four
hundred eight votes on this bill modeled by an ideal point model, thirty-one of these were
modeled incorrectly.
Sometimes these votes are incorrectly predicted because of stochastic circumstances sur-
rounding lawmakers and bills. More often, however, these votes can be explained because
lawmakers are not one-dimensional: they each hold positions on different issues. For example,
Ronald Paul, a Republican representative from Texas, and Dennis Kucinich, a Democratic
representative from Ohio, hold consistent political opinions that an ideal point model sys-
temically gets incorrect. Looking more closely at these errors, we would see that Paul differs
from a typical Republican when it comes to foreign relations and social issues; Kucinich
differs from a usual Democrat when it comes to foreign policy.
The problem is that classical ideal point models place each lawmaker in a single political
position, but a lawmaker’s vote on a bill has to do with a number of factors—her political
affiliation, the content of the proposed legislation, and her political position on that content.
While classical ideal point models can capture the main regularities in lawmakers’ voting
behavior, they cannot predict when and how a lawmaker will vote differently than we expect.
In this paper, we develop the issue-adjusted ideal point model, a model that captures issue-
specific deviation in lawmaker behavior. We place the lawmakers on a political spectrum and
identify how they deviate from their position as a function of specific issues. This results in
inferences like those illustrated in Figure 3. An important component of our model is that we
use the text of the proposed bills to encode which issues they are about. (We do this through
a probabilistic topic model (Blei et al. 2003).) Unlike other attempts at developing multi-
dimensional ideal point models (Jackman 2001), our approach explicitly ties the additional
dimensions to the political discussion at hand.
By incorporating issues, we can model the AmeriCorp bill above much better than we
could with classic ideal points (see Figure 3). By recognizing that this bill is about social
services, and by modeling lawmakers’ positions on this issue, we are able to predict all but
one of the lawmakers’ votes correctly. This is because we can learn to differentiate between
lawmakers who are conservative and lawmakers who are conservative on social services.
For example, the issue-adjusted model tells us that, while Doc Hastings (Republican of
Washington) is considered more conservative than Timothy Johnson (Republican of Illinois)
in the ideal point model, Hastings is much more liberal on social issues than Johnson—hence,
he will more often generally side with Democrats on those votes.
In the following sections, we describe our model and develop efficient approximate pos-
terior inference algorithms for computing with it. To handle the scale of the data we want
to study, we replace the usual MCMC approach with a faster variational inference algo-
rithm. We then study 12 years of legislative votes from the U.S. House of Representatives
and Senate, a collection of 1,203,009 votes. We show that our model gives a better fit to
the data than a classical ideal point model and demonstrate that it provides an interesting
exploratory tool for analyzing legislative behavior.
Related work. Item response theory (IRT) has been used for decades in political science
(Clinton et al. 2004; Martin and Quinn 2002; Poole and Rosenthal 1985); see Fox (2010) for
an overview, Enelow and Hinich (1984) for a historical perspective, and Albert (1992) for
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Bayesian treatments of the model. Some political scientists have used higher-dimensional
ideal points, where each legislator is described by a vector of ideal points xu ∈ RK and
each bill polarization ad (i.e., how divisive it is) takes the same dimension K Heckman and
Snyder (1996). The probability of a lawmaker voting “Yes” is σ(xTuad + bd) (we describe
these assumptions further in the next section). The principle component of ideal points
explains most of the variance and explains party affiliation. However, other dimensions
are not attached to issues, and interpreting beyond the principal component is painstaking
(Jackman 2001).
At the minimum, this painstaking analysis often requires careful study of the original
roll-call votes or study of lawmakers’ ideal-point neighbors. The former obviates an IRT
model, since we cannot make inferences from model parameters alone; while the latter begs
the question, since it assumes we know in the first place how lawmakers vote on different
issues. The model we discuss in this paper is intended to address this problem by providing
interpretable multi-dimensional ideal points. Through posterior inference, we can estimate
each lawmaker’s political position and how it changes on a variety of concrete issues.
The model we will outline takes advantage of recent advances in content analysis, which
have received increasing attention because of their ability to incorporate large collections of
text at a relatively small cost (see Grimmer and Stewart (2012) for an overview of these
methods). For example, Quinn et al. (2006) used text-based methods to understand how
legislators’ attention was being focused on different issues, to provide empirical evidence
toward answering a variety of questions in the political science community.
We will draw heavily on content analytic methods in the machine learning community,
which has developed useful tools for modeling both text and the behavior of individuals
toward items. Recent work in this community has provided joint models of legislative text
and votes. Gerrish and Blei (2011) aimed to predict votes on bills which had not yet received
any votes. This model fitted predictors of each bill’s parameters using the bill’s text, but
the underlying voting model was still one-dimensional–it could not model individual votes
better than a one-dimensional ideal point model. In other work, Wang et al. (2010) developed
a Bayesian nonparametric model of votes and text over time. Both of these models have
different purposes from the model presented here; neither addresses individuals’ affinity
toward different types of bills.
The issue-adjusted model is conceptually more similar to recent models for content rec-
ommendation. Specifically, Wang and Blei (2011) describe a method to recommend academic
articles to users of a service based on what they have already read, and Agarwal and Chen
(2010) proposed a similar model to match users to other items (i.e., Web content). Our
model is related to these approaches, but it is specifically designed to analyze political data.
These works, like ours, model users’ affinities to items. However, neither of them employ
the notion of the orientation of an item (i.e., the political orientation of a bill) or that the
users (i.e., lawmakers) have a position on a this spectrum. These are considerations which
are required when analyzing political roll call data.
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2. THE ISSUE-ADJUSTED IDEAL POINT MODEL
We first review ideal point models of legislative roll call data and discuss their limitations.
We then present our model, the issue-adjusted ideal point model, that accounts for how
legislators vote on specific issues.
2.1. Modeling Political Decisions with Ideal Point Models
Ideal point models are latent variable models that have become a mainstay in quantitative
political science. These models are based on item response theory, a statistical theory that
models how members of a population judge a set of items (see Fox (2010) for an overview).
Applied to voting records, ideal point models place lawmakers on an interpretable political
spectrum. They are widely used to help characterize and understand historical legislative
and judicial decisions (Clinton et al. 2004; Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Martin and Quinn
2002).
One-dimensional ideal point models posit an ideal point xu ∈ R for each lawmaker u.
Each bill d is characterized by its polarity ad and its popularity bd. (The polarity is often
called the “discrimination”, and the popularity is often called the “difficulty”; polarity and
popularity are more accurate terms.) The probability that lawmaker u votes “Yes” on bill d
is given by the logistic regression
p(vud = yes |xu, ad, bd) = σ(xuad + bd), (1)
where σ(s) = exp(s)/(1 + exp(s)) is the logistic function. (A probit function is sometimes
used instead of the logistic. This choice is based on an assumption in the underlying model,
but it has little empirical effect in legislative ideal point models.) When the popularity of
a bill bd is high, nearly everyone votes “Yes”; when the popularity is low, nearly everyone
votes “No”. When the popularity is near zero, the probability that a lawmaker votes “Yes”
is determined primarily by how her ideal point xu interacts with bill polarity ad.
In Bayesian ideal point modeling, the variables ad, bd, and xu are usually assigned stan-
dard normal priors (Clinton et al. 2004). Given a matrix of votes v = {vud}, we can estimate
the posterior expectation of the ideal point of each lawmaker E [xu |v]. Figure 2 illustrates
ideal points estimated from votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 2009-2010.
The model has clearly separated lawmakers by their political party (color) and provides an
intuitive measure of their political leanings.
2.2. Limitations of Ideal Point Models
The ideal point model fit to the House of Representatives from 2009-2010 correctly models
98% of all lawmakers’ votes on training data. (We correctly model an observed vote if its
probability under the model is bigger than 1/2.) But it fits some lawmakers better than
others. It only predicts 83.3% of Baron Hill’s (D-IN) votes and 80.0% of Ronald Paul’s
(R-TX) votes. Why is this?
To understand why, we look at how the ideal point model works. The ideal point model
assumes that lawmakers are ordered, and that each bill d splits them at a cut point. The
cut point is a function of the bill’s popularity and polarity, −bd/ad. Lawmakers with ideal
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Figure 4: In a traditional ideal point model, lawmakers’ ideal points are static. In the
issue-adjusted ideal point model, lawmakers’ ideal points change when they vote on certain
issues, such as taxation (top panel) and health (bottom panel). A line segment connects
select lawmakers’ ideal points (top row of each panel) to their issue-adjusted ideal points
(bottom row of each panel). Unlabeled lawmakers are illustrated by the remaining, faint line
segments. We have colored Democrats blue and Republicans red.
points xu to one side of the cut point are more likely to support the bill; lawmakers with
ideal points to the other side are more likely to reject it. The issue with lawmakers like Paul
and Hill, however, is that this assumption is too strong—their voting behavior does not fit
neatly into a single ordering. Rather, their location among the other lawmakers changes
with different bills.
However, there are still patterns to how they vote. Paul and Hill vote consistently within
individual areas of policy, such as foreign policy or education, though their voting on these
issues diverges from their usual position on the political spectrum. In particular, Paul con-
sistently votes against United States involvement in foreign military engagements, a position
that contrasts with other Republicans. Hill, a “Blue Dog” Democrat, is a strong supporter
of second-amendment rights, opposes same-sex adoption, and is wary of government-run
health care—positions that put him at odds with many other Democrats. Particularly, the
ideal point model would predict Paul and Hill as having muted positions along the classic
left-right spectrum, when in fact they have different opinions about certain issues than their
fellow legislators.
We refer to voting behavior like this as issue voting. An issue is any federal policy area,
such as “financial regulation,” “foreign policy,” “civil liberties,” or “education,” on which
lawmakers are expected to take positions. Lawmakers’ positions on these issues may diverge
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from their traditional left/right stances, but traditional ideal point models cannot capture
this. Our goal is to develop an ideal point model that allows lawmakers to deviate, depending
on the issue under discussion, from their usual political position.
Figure 4 illustrates the kinds of hypotheses our model can make. Each panel represents
an issue; taxation is on the top, and health is on the bottom. Within each panel, the top line
illustrates the ideal points of various lawmakers—these represent the relative political posi-
tions of each lawmaker for most issues. The bottom line illustrates the position adjusted for
the issue at hand. For example, the model posits that Charles Djou (Republican representa-
tive for Hawaii) is more similar to Republicans on taxation and more similar to Democrats on
health, while Ronald Paul (Republican representative for Texas) is more Republican-leaning
on health and less extreme on taxation. Posterior estimates like this give us a window into
voting behavior that is not available to classic ideal point models.
2.3. Issue-adjusted Ideal Points
The issue-adjusted ideal point model is a latent variable model of roll call data. As with the
classical ideal point model, bills and lawmakers are attached to popularity, polarity, and ideal
points. In addition, the text of each bill encodes the issues it discusses and, for each vote,
the ideal points of the lawmakers are adjusted according to those issues. (We obtain issue
codes from text by using a probabilistic topic model. This is described below in Section 2.5.)
In more detail, each bill is associated with a popularity ad and polarity bd; each lawmaker
is associated with an ideal point xu. Assume that there areK issues in the political landscape,
such as finance, taxation, or health care. Each bill contains its textwd, a collection of observed
words, from we which we derive a K-vector of issue proportions θ(wd). The issue proportions
represent how much each bill is about each issue. A bill can be about multiple issues (e.g., a
bill might be about the tax structure surrounding health care), but these values will sum to
one. Finally, each lawmaker is associated with a real-valued K-vector of issue adjustments
zu. Each component of this vector describes how his or her ideal point changes as a function
of the issues being discussed. For example, a left-wing lawmaker may be more right wing on
defense; a right-wing lawmaker may be more left wing on social issues.
For the vote on bill d, we linearly combine the issue proportions θ(wd) with each law-
maker’s issue adjustment zu to give an adjusted ideal point xu + z
>
u θ(wd). The votes are
then modeled with a logistic regression,
p(vud|ad, bd, zu, xu,wd) = σ
(
(xu + z
>
u θ(wd))ad + bd
)
. (2)
We put standard normal priors on the ideal points, polarity, and popularity variables. We
use Laplace priors for the issue adjustments zu,
p(zuk |λ1) ∝ exp (−λ1||zuk||1) .
Using MAP inference, this finds sparse adjustments. With full Bayesian inference, it finds
nearly-sparse adjustments. Sparsity is desirable for the issue adjustments because we do
not expect each lawmaker to adjust her ideal point xu for every issue; rather, the issue
adjustments are meant to capture the handful of issues on which she does diverge.
Suppose there are U lawmakers, D bills, and K issues. The generative probabilistic
process for the issue-adjusted ideal point model is the following.
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(LDA model)
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Figure 5: A graphical model for the issue-adjusted ideal point model, which models votes
vud from lawmakers and legislative items. Lawmakers’ positions are determined by xu and zu,
a k-vector which interacts with bill-specific issue mixtures θd (also k-vectors). Issue mixtures
are fit from text using labeled latent Dirichlet allocation. As with ideal points models, ad
and bd are bill-specific variables describing the bill’s polarization and popularity.
1. For each user u ∈ {1, . . . , U}:
(a) Draw ideal points xu ∼ N (0, 1).
(b) Draw issue adjustments zuk ∼ Laplace(λ1) for each issue k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
2. For each bill d ∈ {1, . . . , D}:
(a) Draw polarity ad ∼ N (0, 1).
(b) Draw popularity bd ∼ N (0, 1).
3. Draw vote vud from Equation 2 for each user/bill pair, u ∈ {1, . . . , U} and d ∈
{1, . . . , D}.
Figure 5 illustrates the graphical model. Given roll call data and bill texts, we can use poste-
rior expectations to estimate the latent variables. For each lawmaker, these are the expected
ideal points and per-issue adjustments; these are the posterior estimates we illustrated in
Figure 4. For each bill, these are the expected polarity and popularity.
We consider a simple example to better understand this model. Suppose a bill d is
only about finance. This means that θ(wd) has a one in the finance dimension and zero
everywhere else. With a classic ideal point model, a lawmaker u’s ideal point xu gives his
position on every bill, regardless of the issue. With the issue-adjusted ideal point model, his
effective ideal point for this bill is xu + zu,Finance, adjusting his position based on the bill’s
content. The adjustment zu,Finance might move him to the right or the left, capturing an
issue-dependent change in his ideal point.
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In the next section we will describe a posterior inference algorithm that will allow us to
estimate xu and zu from lawmakers’ votes. An eager reader can scan ahead to browse these
effective ideal points for Ron Paul, Dennis Kucinich, and a handful of other lawmakers in
Figure 13. This figure shows the posterior mean of issue-adjusted ideal points that have been
inferred from votes about finance (top) and votes about congressional sessions (bottom).
In general, a bill might involve several issues; in that case the issue vector θ(wd) will
include multiple positive components. We have not yet described this important function,
θ(wd), which codes a bill with its issues. We describe that function in Section 2.5. First
we discuss the relationship between the issue adjusted model and other models of political
science data.
2.4. Relationship to Other Models of Roll-call Data
The issue-adjusted ideal point model recovers the classical ideal point model if all of the
adjustments (for all of the lawmakers) are equal to zero. In that case, as for the classical
model, each bill cuts the lawmakers at −bd/ad to determine the probabilities of voting “yes.”
With non-zero adjustments, however, the model asserts that the relative positions of law-
makers can change depending on the issue. Different bill texts, through the coding function
θ(wd), will lead to different orderings of the lawmakers. Again, Figure 4 illustrates these
re-orderings for idealized bills, i.e., those that are only about taxation or healthcare.
Issue adjusted models are an interpretable multidimensional ideal point model. In pre-
vious variants of multidimensional ideal point models, each lawmaker’s ideal point xu and
each bill’s polarity ad are vectors; the probability of a “yes” vote is σ(x
>
uad + bd) (Heckman
and Snyder 1996; Jackman 2001). When fit to data from U.S. politics the principle dimen-
sion invariably explains most of the variance, separating left-wing and right-wing lawmakers,
and subsequent dimensions capture other kinds of patterns in voting behavior. Researchers
developed these models to capture the complexity of politics beyond the left/right divide.
However, these models are difficult to use because (as for classical factor analysis) the di-
mensions are not readily interpretable—nothing ties them to concrete issues such as Foreign
Policy or Defense (Jackman 2001). Our model circumvents the problem of interpreting
higher dimensions of ideal points.
The problem is that classical models only analyze the votes. To coherently bring issues
into the picture, we need to include what the bills are about. Thus, the issue-adjusted model
is a multidimensional ideal point model where each additional dimension is explicitly tied to
a political issue. The language of the bills determine which dimensions are “active” when
modeling the votes. Unlike previous multidimensional ideal point models, we do not posit
higher dimensions and then hope that they will correspond to known issues. Rather, we
explicitly model lawmakers’ votes on different issues by capturing how the issues in a bill
relate to deviations from issue-independent voting patterns.
2.5. Using Labeled LDA to Associate Bills with Issues
We now describe the issue-encoding function θ. This function takes the language of a bill
as input and returns a K-vector that represents the proportions with which each issue is
discussed. In particular, we use labeled latent Dirichlet allocation (Ramage et al. 2009). To
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Top words in selected issues
Terrorism Commemorations Transportation Education
terrorist nation transportation student
September people minor school
attack life print university
nation world tax charter school
york serve land history
terrorist attack percent guard nation
Hezbollah community coast guard child
national guard family substitute college
Figure 6: The eight most frequent words from topics fit using labeled LDA (Ramage et al.
2009).
use this method, we estimate a set of “topics,” i.e., distributions over words, associated with
an existing taxonomy of political issues. We then estimate the degree to which each bill
exhibits these topics. This treats the text as a noisy signal of the issues that it encodes, and
we can use both tagged bills (i.e., bills associated with a set of issues) and untagged bills to
estimate the model.
Labeled LDA is a topic model, a model that assumes that our collection of bills can be
described by a set of themes, and that each bill in this collection is a bag-of-words drawn
from a mixture of those themes. The themes, called topics, are distributions over a fixed
vocabulary. In unsupervised LDA—and many other topic models—these themes are fit to
the data (Blei et al. 2003; Blei 2012). In labeled LDA, the themes are defined by using an
existing tagging scheme. Each tag is associated with a topic, and its distribution is found by
taking the empirical distribution of words for documents assigned to that tag, an approach
heavily influenced by, but simpler than, that of Ramage et al. (2009). This gives interpretable
names (the tags) to the topics. (We note that our method is readily applicable to the fully
unsupervised case, i.e., for studying a political history with untagged bills. However, such
analysis requires an additional step of interpreting the topics.)
We used tags provided by the Congressional Research Service (CRS 2012), a service that
provides subject codes for all bills passing through Congress. These subject codes describe
the bills using phrases which correspond to traditional issues, such as civil rights and national
security. Each bill may cover multiple issues, so multiple codes may apply to each bill. (Many
bills have more than twenty labels.) Figure 6 illustrates the top words from several of these
labeled topics. We then performed two iterations of unsupervised LDA ((Blei et al. 2003)
with variational inference to smooth the word counts in these topics. We used the 74 issues
in all (the most-frequent issue labels); we summarize all 74 of them in Appendix B.1.
With topics in hand, we model each bill with a mixed-membership model: Each bill is
drawn from a mixture of the topics, but each one exhibits them with different proportions.
Denote the K topics by β1:K and let α be a vector of Dirichlet parameters. The generative
process for each bill d is:
1. Choose topic proportions θd ∼ Dirichlet(α).
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2. For each word n ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
(a) Choose a topic assignment zd,n ∼ θd.
(b) Choose a word wd,n ∼ βzd,n .
The function θ(wd) is the posterior expectation of θd. It represents the degree to which the
bill exhibits the K topics, where those topics are explicitly tied to political issues through
the congressional codes, and it is estimated using variational inference at the document
level (Blei et al. 2003). The topic modeling portion of the model is illustrated on the left
hand side of the graphical model in Figure 5.
We have completed our specification of the model. Given roll call data and bill texts,
we first compute the issue vectors for each bill. We then use these in the issue-adjusted
ideal point model of Figure 5 to infer each legislator’s posterior ideal point and per-issue
adjustment. We now turn to the central computational problem for this model, posterior
inference.
3. POSTERIOR ESTIMATION
Given roll call data and an encoding of the bills to issues, we form inferences and predictions
through the posterior distribution of the latent ideal points, issue adjustments, and bill vari-
ables, p(x, z, a, b|v,θ). In the next section, we inspect this posterior to explore lawmakers’
positions about specific issues.
As for most interesting Bayesian models, this posterior is not tractable to compute;
we must approximate it. Approximate posterior inference for Bayesian ideal point models
is usually performed with MCMC methods, such as Gibbs sampling (Johnson and Albert
1999; Jackman 2001; Martin and Quinn 2002; Clinton et al. 2004). Here we will develop an
alternative algorithm based on variational inference. Variational inference tends to be faster
than MCMC, can handle larger data sets, and is attractive when fast Gibbs updates are not
available. In the next section, we will use variational inference to analyze twelve years of roll
call data.
3.1. Mean-field Variational Inference
In variational inference we select a simplified family of candidate distributions over the
latent variables and then find the member of that family which is closest in KL divergence
to the posterior of interest (Jordan et al. 1999; Wainwright and Jordan 2008). This turns
the problem of posterior inference into an optimization problem. For posterior inference in
the issue-adjusted model, we use the fully-factorized family of distributions over the latent
variables, i.e., the mean-field family,
q(x,y, z, a, b|η) =
(∏
U
N (xu|x˜u, σ2x)N (zu|z˜u, σ2z)
)(∏
D
N (ad|a˜d, σ2a)N (bd|b˜d, σ2b )
)
. (3)
This family is indexed by the variational parameters η =
{
(x˜u, σx), (z˜u, σzu), (a˜, σa), (b˜, σb)
}
,
which specify the means and variances of the random variables in the variational posterior.
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While the model specifies priors over the latent variables, in the variational family each
instance of each latent variable, such as each lawmaker’s issue adjustment for Taxation, is
endowed with its own variational distribution. This lets us capture data-specific marginals—
for example, that one lawmaker is more conservative about Taxation while another is more
liberal.
We fit the variational parameters to minimize the KL divergence between the variational
posterior and the true posterior. Once fit, we can use the variational means to form predic-
tions and posterior descriptive statistics of the lawmakers’ issue adjustments. In ideal point
models, the means of a variational distribution can be excellent proxies for those of the true
posterior (Gerrish and Blei 2011)).
3.2. The Variational Objective
Variational inference proceeds by taking the fully-factorized distribution (Equation 3) and
successively updating the parameters η to minimize the KL divergence between the varia-
tional distribution (Equation 3) and the true posterior:
ηˆ = arg min
η
KL (qη(x, z, a, b)||p(x,a, a, b|v)) (4)
This optimization is usually reformulated as the problem of maximizing a lower bound (found
via Jensen’s inequality) on the marginal probability of the observations:
p(v) =
∫
η
p(x, z, a, b, v)dxdzdadb
≥
∫
η
qη(x, z, a, b) log
p(x, z, a, b, v)
qη(x, z, a, b)
dxdzdadb
=Eq [p(x, z, a, b, v)]− Eq [qη(x, z, a, b)] = Lη. (5)
We follow the example of Braun and McAuliffe (2010) by referring to the lower bound Lη as
the evidence lower bound (ELBO).
For many models, the ELBO can be expanded as a closed-form function of the varia-
tional parameters and then optimized with gradient ascent or coordinate ascent. However,
the issue-adjusted ideal point model does not allow for a closed-form objective. Previous
research on such non-conjugate models overcomes this by approximating the ELBO (Braun
and McAuliffe 2010; Gerrish and Blei 2011). Such methods are effective, but they require
many model-specific algebraic tricks and tedious derivations. Here we take an alternative
approach, where we approximate the gradient of the ELBO with Monte-Carlo integration
and perform stochastic gradient ascent with this approximation. This gave us an easier way
to fit the variational objective for our complex model.
3.3. Optimizing the Variational Objective with a Stochastic Gradient
We begin by computing the gradient of the ELBO in Equation 5. We rewrite it in terms
of integrals, then exchange the order of integration and differentiation, and apply the chain
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rule:
∇Lη = ∇
[∫
qη(x, z, a, b)(log p(x, z, a, b, v)− log qη(x, z, a, b))dx
]
(6)
=
∫
∇
[
qη(x, z, a, b)(log p(x, z, a, b, v)− log qη(x, z, a, b))
]
dx
=
∫
∇qη(x, z, a, b)(log p(x, z, a, b, v)− log qη(x, z, a, b))− qη(x, z, a, b)∇ log qηdx.
Above we have assumed that the support of qη is not a function of η, and that log qη(x, z, a, b)
and ∇ log qη(x, z, a, b) are continuous with respect to η.
We can rewrite Equation 6 as an expectation by using the identity qη(x)∇ log qη(x) =
∇qη(x):
∇Lη = Eq [∇ log qη(x, z, a, b) (log p(x, z, a, b, v)− log qη(x, z, a, b)− 1)] . (7)
Next we use Monte Carlo integration to form an unbiased estimate of the gradient at η = η0.
We obtain M iid samples (x1, . . . , xM , . . . , b1, . . . , bM) from the variational distribution qη0
for the approximation
∇Lη
∣∣∣
η0
≈
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇ log qη(xm, zm, am, bm)
∣∣∣
η0
(log p(xm, zm, am, bm, y)− log qη0(xm, zm, am, bm)− C).
(8)
We denote this approximation ∇˜Lη|η0 . Note we replaced the 1 in Equation 7 with a con-
stant C, which does not affect the expected value of the gradient (this follows because
Eq [∇ log qη(x, z, a, b)] = 0). We discuss in the supplementary materials how to set C to min-
imize variance. Related estimates of similar gradients have been studied in recent work (Car-
bonetto et al. 2009; Graves 2011; Paisley et al. 2012) and in the context of expectation
maximization (Wei and Tanner 1990).
Using this method for finding an approximate gradient, we optimize the ELBO with
stochastic optimization (Robbins and Monro 1951; Spall 2003; Bottou and Cun 2004).
Stochastic optimization follows noisy estimates of the gradient with a decreasing step-size.
While stochastic optimization alone is sufficient to achieve convergence, it may take a long
time to converge. To improve convergence rates, we used two additional ideas: quasi-Monte
Carlo samples (which minimize variance) and second-order updates (which eliminate the
need to select an optimization parameter). We provide details of these improvements in the
appendix.
Let us return briefly to the problem that motivated this section. Our goal is to estimate
the mean of the hidden random variables—such as lawmakers’ issue adjustments z—from
their votes on bills. We achieved this by variational Bayes, which amounts to maximizing
the ELBO (Equation 5) with respect to the variational parameters. This maximization is
achieved with stochastic optimization on Equation 8. In the next section we will empirically
study these inferred variables (i.e., the expectations induced by the variational distribution)
to better understand distinctive voting behavior.
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4. ISSUE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
We used the issue-adjusted ideal point model to study the complete roll call record from the
United States Senate and House of Representatives during the years 1999-2010. We report
on this study in this and the next section. We first evaluate the model fitness to this data,
confirming that issue-adjustments give a better model of roll call data and that the encoding
of bills to issues is responsible for the improvement. We then use our inferences to give a
qualitative look at U.S. lawmakers’ issue preferences, demonstrating how to use our richer
model of lawmaker behavior to explore a political history.
4.1. The United States Congress from 1999-2010
We studied U.S. Senate and House of Representative roll-call votes from 1999 to 2010. This
period spanned Congresses 106 to 111, the majority of which Republican President George
W. Bush held office. Bush’s inauguration and the attacks of September 11th, 2001 marked
the first quarter of this period, followed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Democrats
gained a significant share of seats from 2007 to 2010, taking the majority from Republicans
in both the House and the Senate. Democratic President Barack Obama was inaugurated
in January 2009.
The roll-call votes are recorded when at least one lawmaker wants an explicit record of the
votes on the bill. For a lawmaker, such records are useful to demonstrate his or her positions
on issues. Roll calls serve as an incontrovertible record for any lawmaker who wants one.
We downloaded both roll-call tables and bills from www.govtrack.us, a nonpartisan website
which provides records of U.S. Congressional voting. Not all bill texts were available, and
we ignored votes on bills that did not receive a roll call, but we had over one hundred for
each Congress. Table 7 summarizes the statistics of our data.
We fit our models to two-year periods in the House and (separately) to two-year periods
in the Senate. Some bills received votes in both the House and Senate; in those cases, the
issue-adjusted model’s treatment of the bill in the House was completely independent of its
treatment by the model in the Senate.
Vocabulary. To fit the labeled topic model to each bill, we represented each bill as a
vector of phrase counts. This “bag of phrases” is similar to the “bag of words” assumption
commonly used in natural language processing. To select this vocabulary, we considered
all phrases of length one word to five words. We then omitted content-free phrases such as
“and”, “when”, and “to the”. The full vocabulary consisted of 5,000 n-grams (further details
of vocabulary selection are in Appendix B.2). We used these phrases to algorithmically define
topics and assign issue weights to bills as described in Section 2.5.
Identification. When using ideal-point models for interpretation, we must address the
issue of identification. The signs of ideal points xu and bill polarities ad are arbitrary,
for example, because xuad = (−xu)(−ad). This leads to a multimodal posterior (Jackman
2001). We address this by flipping ideal points and bill polarities if necessary to follow the
convention that Republicans are generally on the right (positive on the line) and Democrats
are generally on the left (negative on the line).
16
Figure 7: Roll-call data sets used in the experiments. These counts include votes in both
the House and Senate. Congress 107 had fewer votes than the remaining congresses in
part because this period included large shifts in party power, in addition to the attacks on
September 11th, 2001. The number of lawmakers within each House and Senate varies by
congress because there was some turnover within each Congress. In addition, some lawmakers
never voted on legislation in our experiments (recall, we used legislation for which both text
was available and for which the roll-call was recorded).
Statistics for the U.S. Senate
Congress Years Lawmakers Bills Votes
106 1999-2000 81 101 7,612
107 2001-2002 78 76 5,547
108 2003-2004 101 83 7,830
109 2005-2006 102 74 7,071
110 2007-2008 103 97 9,019
111 2009-2010 110 62 5,936
Statistics for the U.S. House of Representatives
Congress Years Lawmakers Bills Votes
106 1999-2000 437 345 142,623
107 2001-2002 61 360 18,449
108 2003-2004 440 490 200,154
109 2005-2006 441 458 187,067
110 2007-2008 449 705 287,645
111 2009-2010 446 810 330,956
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4.2. Ideal Point Models vs. Issue-adjusted Ideal Point Models
The issue-adjusted ideal point model in Equation 2 is a generalization of the traditional
ideal point model (see Section 2.4). Before using this more complicated model to explore
our data, we empirically justify this increased complexity. We first outline empirical differ-
ences between issue-adjusted ideal points and traditional idea points. We then report on a
quantitative validation of the issue-adjusted model.
Examples: adjusting for issues. To give a sense of how the issue-adjusted ideal point
model works, Table 8 gives a side-by-side comparison of traditional ideal points xu and issue-
adjusted ideal points (xu+z
T
u θ) for the ten most-improved bills of Congress 111 (2009-2010).
For each bill, the top row shows the ideal points of lawmakers who voted “Yea” on the bill
and the bottom row shows lawmakers who voted “Nay”. The top and bottom rows are a
partition of votes rather than separate treatments of the same votes. In a good model of
roll call data, these two sets of points will be separated, and the model can place the bill
parameters at the correct cut point. Over the whole data set, the cut point of the votes
improved in 14,347 heldout votes. (It got worse in 8,304 votes and stayed the same in 5.7M.)
Comparing issue-adjusted ideal points to traditional ideal points. The traditional
ideal point model (Equation 1) uses one variable per lawmaker, the ideal point xu, to explain
all of her voting behavior. In contrast, the issue-adjusted model (Equation 2) uses xu along
with K issue adjustments. Here we ask, how does does xu under these two models differ?
We fit ideal points to the 111th House (2009 to 2010) and issue-adjusted ideal points to the
same period with regularization λ = 1.
The top panel of Figure 4.2 compares the classical ideal points to the global ideal points
from the issue-adjusted model. In this parallel plot, the top axis of this represents a law-
maker’s ideal point xu under the classical model, while the bottom axis represents his global
ideal point under the issue-adjusted model. (We will use plots like this again in this paper.
It is called a parallel plot, and it compares separate treatments of lawmakers. Lines between
the same lawmakers under different treatment are shaded based on their deviation from a
linear model to highlight unique lawmakers.) The ideal points in Figure 4.2 are similar; their
correlation coefficient is 0.998. The most noteworthy difference is that lawmakers appear
more partisan under the traditional ideal point model—enough that Democrats are com-
pletely separated from Republicans by xu—while issue-adjusted ideal points provide a softer
split.
This is not surprising, because the issue-adjusted model is able to use lawmakers’ ad-
justments to explain their votes. In fact, the political parties are better separated with issue
adjustments than they are by ideal points alone. We checked this by writing each lawmaker
u as the vector wu := (xu, zu,1, . . . , zu,k) and performing linear discriminant analysis to find
that vector β which “best” separates lawmakers by party along wTu β.
We illustrate lawmakers’ projections wTu β along the discriminant vector β in the bottom
figure of Figure 4.2 (we normalized variance of these projections to match that of the ideal
points). The correlation coefficient between this prediction and political party is 0.979, much
higher than the correlation between ideal points xu and political party (0.921).
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Bill description Votes by ideal point Votes by adjusted point
H. Res 806 (amending an
education/environment
trust fund)
+
−
+
−
Providing for con-
ditional adjourn-
ment/recess of Congress
+
−
+
−
Establish R&D pro-
gram for gas turbines
+
−
+
−
Recognizing Ameri-
Corps and community
service
+
−
+
−
Providing for condi-
tional adjournment of
Congress
+
−
+
−
Providing for the sine
die adjournment of
Congress
+
−
+
−
Providing for an ad-
journment / recess of
Congress
+
−
+
−
Preventing child mar-
riage in developing
countries
+
−
+
−
Providing for a condi-
tional House adjourn-
ment
+
−
+
−
Congratulating UMD
Men’s basketball
+
−
−2 0 2 4
+
−
−2 0 2 4
Figure 8: Issue-adjusted ideal points can explain votes better than standard ideal points.
The x-axis of each small plot shows ideal point or issue-adjusted ideal point for a lawmaker.
Each bill’s indifference point −bd/ad is shown as a vertical line. Positive votes (orange) and
negative votes (purple) are better-divided by issue-adjusted ideal points.
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Figure 9: Classic issue-adjusted ideal points xu (top row, both figures) separate lawmakers
by party better than un-adjusted ideal points xu from the issue-adjusted model (bottom
row, top figure). The issue-adjusted model can still separate Republicans from Democrats
better than the ideal point model along a separating vector (bottom row, bottom figure).
In each figure, Republicans are colored red, and Democrats are blue. These ideal points
were estimated in the 111th House of Representatives. The line connecting ideal points from
each model has opacity proportional to the squared residuals in a linear model fit to predict
issue-adjusted ideal points from ideal points. The separating vector was defined using linear
discriminant analysis.
To be sure, some of this can be explained by random variation in the additional 74
dimensions. To check the extent of this improvement due only to dimension, we draw
random issue adjustments from normal random variables with the same variance as the
empirically observed issue adjustments. In 100 tests like this, the correlation coefficient was
higher than for classical ideal points, but not by much: 0.933 ± 0.004. Thus, the posterior
issue adjustments provide a signal for separating the political parties better than ideal points
alone. In fact, we will see in Section 5.2 that procedural votes driven by political ideology is
one of the factors driving this improvement.
Changes in bills’ parameters. Bills’ polarity ad and popularity bd are similar under
both the traditional ideal point model and the issue-adjusted model. We illustrate bills’
parameters in these two models in Figure 10 and note some exceptions.
First, procedural bills stand out from other bills in becoming more popular overall. In
Figure 10, procedural bills have been separated from traditional ideal points. We attribute
the difference in procedural bills’ parameters to procedural cartel theory, which we describe
further in Section 5.2.
The remaining bills have also become less popular but more polarized under the issue-
adjusted model. This is because the issue-adjusted model represents the interaction between
lawmakers and bills with K additional bill-specific variables, all of which are mediated by
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Popularity Polarity
Not proce-
dural
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
   Ideal point model
Issue adjusted model
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
   Ideal point model
Issue adjusted model
Procedural
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
   Ideal point model
Issue adjusted model
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
   Ideal point model
Issue adjusted model
Figure 10: Procedural bills are more popular under the issue-adjusted voting model. Top:
popularity bd of procedural bills under the issue-adjusted voting model is greater than with
traditional ideal points. Bottom: consistent with Cox and Poole (2002) and procedural cartel
theory, the polarity of procedural bills is generally more extreme than that of non-procedural
bills. However, issue adjustments lead to increased polarity (i.e., certainty) among non-
procedural votes as well. The procedural issues include congressional reporting requirements,
government operations and politics, House of Representatives, House rules and procedure,
legislative rules and procedure, and Congress.
the bill’s polarity. This means that the the model is able to depend more on bills’ polarities
than bills’ popularities to explain votes. For example, Donald Young regularly voted against
honorary names for regional post offices. These bills—usually very popular—would have
high popularity under the ideal point model. The issue-adjusted model also assigns high
popularity to these bills, but it takes advantage of lawmaker’s positions on the postal facilities
issue to explain votes, decreasing reliance on the bill’s popularity (postal facilities was more
common than 50% of other issues, including human rights, finance, and terrorism).
4.3. Evaluation of the Predictive Distribution
We have described the qualitative differences between the issue-adjusted model and the
traditional ideal point model. We now turn to a quantitative evaluation: Does the issue-
adjusted model give a better fit to legislative data?
We answer this question via cross validation and the predictive distribution of votes. For
each session, we divide the votes, i.e., individual lawmaker/bill pairs, into folds. For each
fold, we hold out the votes assigned to it, fit our models to the remaining votes, and then
evaluate the log probability of the held out votes under the predictive distribution. A better
model will assign higher probability to the held-out data. We compared several methods:
1. The issue-adjusted ideal point model with topics found by labeled LDA: This is the
model and algorithm described above. We used a regularization parameter λ = 1. (See
Appendix A.3 for a study of the effect of regularization.)
2. The issue-adjusted ideal point model with explicit labels on the bills: Rather than infer
topics with labeled LDA, we used the CRS labels explicitly. If a bill contains J labels,
we gave it weight 1/J at each of the corresponding components of the topic vector θ.
3. The traditional ideal point model of Clinton et al. (2004): This model makes no ref-
erence to issues. To manage the scale of the data, and keep the comparison fair, we
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Figure 11: Average log-likelihood of heldout votes across all sessions for the House and
Senate. Log-likelihood was averaged across folds using six-fold cross validation for Congresses
106 to 111 (1999-2010) with regularization λ = 1. The variational distribution had higher
heldout log-likelihood for all congresses in both chambers than either
Heldout log likelihood of Senate votes
Congress 106 107 108 109 110 111
Traditional ideal point model (IPM) -0.209 -0.209 -0.182 -0.189 -0.206 -0.182
Issue-adjusted IPM (with labeled LDA) -0.208 -0.209 -0.181 -0.188 -0.205 -0.180
Issue-adjusted IPM (with direct labels) -0.208 -0.209 -0.182 -0.189 -0.206 -0.181
Standard LDA -0.208 -0.210 -0.184 -0.189 -0.207 -0.181
Issue-adjusted IPM (with permuted issues) -0.210 -0.210 -0.183 -0.203 -0.211 -0.186
Heldout log likelihood of House votes
Traditional ideal point model (IPM) -0.168 -0.154 -0.096 -0.120 -0.090 -0.077
Issue-adjusted IPM (with labeled LDA) -0.167 -0.151 -0.095 -0.118 -0.089 -0.076
Issue-adjusted IPM (with direct labels) -0.167 -0.151 -0.094 -0.117 -0.088 -0.075
Standard LDA -0.171 -0.154 -0.097 -0.121 -0.091 -0.078
Issue-adjusted IPM (with permuted issues) -0.167 -0.155 -0.096 -0.122 -0.090 -0.077
used variational inference. (In Gerrish and Blei (2011), we showed that variational
approximations find as good approximate posteriors as MCMC in ideal point models.)
4. A permuted issue-adjusted model: Here, we selected a random permutation pi ∈ SD,
to shuffle the D topic vectors θd → θpi(d) and fit the issue-adjusted model with the per-
muted vectors. This permutation test removes the information contained in matching
bills to issues, though it maintains the same empirical distribution over topic mixtures.
It can indicate that improvement we see over traditional ideal points is due to the bills’
topics, not due to spurious factors (such as the change in dimension). In this method
we used five random permutations.
We summarize the results in Table 11. In all chambers in both Congresses, the issue-
adjusted model represents heldout votes with higher log-likelihood than an ideal point
model. Further, every permutation represented votes with lower log-likelihood than the
issue-adjusted model. In most cases they were also lower than an ideal point model. These
tables validate the additional complexity of the issue-adjusted ideal point model.
5. EXPLORING ISSUES AND LAWMAKERS
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the issue-adjusted IPM gives a better fit to
roll call data than the traditional ideal point model. While we used prediction to validate
the model, we emphasize that it is primarily an exploratory tool. As for the traditional ideal
point model, it is useful for summarizing and characterizing roll call data. In this section, we
demonstrate how to use the approximate posterior to explore a collection of bills, lawmakers,
and votes through the lens of the issue-adjusted model.
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We will focus on the 111th Congress (2009-2010). First, we show on which issues the issue-
adjusted model best fits. We then discuss several specific lawmakers, showing voting patterns
that identify lawmakers who transcend their party lines. We finally describe procedural cartel
theory (Cox and Poole 2002), which explains why certain lawmakers have such different
preferences on procedural issues like congressional sessions than substantive issues like as
finance.
5.1. Issues Improved by Issue Adjustment
Which issues give the issue-adjusted model an edge over the traditional model? We measured
this with a metric we will refer to as issue improvement. Issue improvement is the weighted
improvement in log likelihood for the issue-adjusted model relative to the traditional model.
We formalize this by defining the log likelihood of each lawmaker’s vote
Jud = 1{vud=yes}p− log(1 + exp(p)), (9)
where p = (xu + z
T
u θd)ad + bd is the log-odds of a vote under the issue-adjusted voting
model. We also measure the corresponding log-likelihood Iud under the ideal point model,
using p = xuad + bd. The improvement of issue k is then the sum of the improvement in
log-likelihood, weighted by how much each vote represents issue k:
Impk =
∑
vud
θdvk(Jud − Iud)∑
vud
θdvk
. (10)
A high value of Impk indicates that issue k is associated with an increase in log-likelihood,
while a low value is associated with a decrease in log-likelihood.
We measured this for each issue in the 111th House. As this was an empirical question
about the entire House, we fit the model to all votes (in contrast to the analysis above, which
fit the model to five out of six folds, for each of the six folds).
We illustrate Impk for a all issues in Figure 12. All issues increased log-likelihood; those
associated with the greatest increase tended to be related to procedural votes. For example,
women, religion, and military personnel issues are nearly unaffected by lawmakers’ offsets.
For those issues, a global political spectrum (i.e., a single dimension) capably explains the
lawmakers’ positions.
5.2. Exploring the Issue Adjustments
The purpose of our model is to adjust lawmaker’s ideal points according to the issues under
discussion. In this section, we demonstrate a number of ways to explore this information.
We begin with a brief summary of the main information obtained by this model. During
posterior inference, we jointly estimate the mean x˜u, z˜u of all lawmakers’ positions lawmakers’
issue-adjusted ideal points. These issue adjustments z˜u adjust how we expect lawmakers
to vote given their un-adjusted ideal points x˜. We illustrate this for finance (a substantive
issue) and congressional sessions (a procedural issue) in Figure 13 and summarize all issues in
Figure 14. Upon a cursory inspection, it is clear that in some issues, lawmakers’ adjustments
are relatively sparse, i.e. only a few lawmakers’ adjustments are interesting. In other issues—
such as the procedural issue congressional sessions—these adjustments are more systemic.
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Transportation
Human rights
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Children
Crime and law enforcement
East Asia
Taxation
Special days
Minorities
Congressional tributes
Women
Law
Special weeks
Civil liberties
International affairs
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Veterans
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Figure 12: Log-likelihood increases when using adjusted ideal points most for procedural
and strategic votes and less for issues frequently discussed during elections. Impk is shown
on the x-axis, while issues are spread on the y-axis for display. The size of each issue k is
proportional to the logarithm of the weighted sum
∑
vud
θdk of votes about the issue.
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Figure 13: Ideal points xu and issue-adjusted ideal points xu + zuk from the 111th House for
the substantive issue finance and the procedural issue congressional sessions. Democrats are
blue and Republicans are red. Votes about finance and congressional sessions were better
fit using issue-adjusted ideal points. For procedural votes such as congressional sessions,
lawmakers become more polarized by political party, behavior predicted by procedural cartel
theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993).
Adjustments by issue and party. Figure 15 illustrates the distribution across lawmak-
ers of the posterior issue adjustments (denoted z˜uk) for issues with the highest and lowest
variance. This figure shows the distribution for the four issues with the greatest variation in
z˜uk (across lawmakers) and the four issues with the least variation. Note the systematic bias
in Democrats’ and Republicans’ issue preferences: they become more partisan on certain
issues, particularly procedural ones.
Controlling for ideal points. We found that posterior issue adjustments can correlate
with the ideal point of the lawmaker—for example, a typical Republican tends to have a
Republican offset on taxation. In some settings, we are more interested in understanding
when a Republican deviates from behavior suggested by her ideal point. We can shed light
on this systemic issue bias by explicitly controlling for it. To do this, we fit a regression for
each issue k to explain away the effect of a lawmaker’s ideal point xu on her offset zuk:
zk = βkX + ε,
where βk ∈ R. Instead of evaluating a lawmaker’s observed offsets, we use her residual
zˆuk = zuk − βkxu, which we call the corrected issue adjustment. By doing this, we can
evaluate lawmakers in the context of other lawmakers who share the same ideal points: a
positive offset zˆuk for a Democrat means she tends to vote more conservatively about issue
k than others with the same ideal point (most of whom are Democrats).
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Figure 14: Ideal points xu and issue-adjusted ideal points xu + zuk from the 111th House for
all issues.
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Figure 15: Histogram of issue adjustments for selected issues. Democrats are in the left
column, and Republicans are in the right column. Both Democrats and Republicans tend
to have small issue adjustments for traditional issues. Their issue adjustments differ sub-
stantially for procedural issues. A more-dispersed distribution of issue adjustments does
not mean that these lawmakers tend to feel differently from one another about these issues.
Instead, it means that lawmakers deviate from their ideal points more.
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Figure 16: Significant issue adjustments for exceptional senators in Congress 111. Each
illustrated issue is significant to p < 0.05 by a permutation test.
Most issues had only a moderate relationship to ideal points. House rules and procedure
was the most-correlated with ideal points, moving the adjusted ideal point βk = 0.26 right
for every unit increase in ideal point. public land and natural resources and taxation followed
at a distance, moving an ideal point 0.04 and 0.025 respectively with each unit increase in
ideal point. health, on the other hand, moved lawmakers βk = 0.04 left for every unit increase
in ideal point. At the other end of the spectrum, the issues women, religion, and military
personnel were nearly unaffected by lawmakers’ offsets.
Extreme lawmakers. We next use these corrected issue adjustments to identify lawmak-
ers’ exceptional issue preferences. To identify adjustments which are significant, we turn
again to the same nonparametric check described in the last section: permute issue vectors’
document labels, i.e. (θ1, . . . ,θD) 7→ (θpii(1) . . .θpii(D)), and refit lawmakers’ adjustments us-
ing both the original issue vectors and permuted issue vectors, for permutations pi1, . . . , pi20.
We then compare a corrected issue adjustment zˆuk’s absolute value with corrected issue
adjustments estimated with permuted issue vectors θpii(d)k. This provides a nonparametric
method for finding issue adjustments which are more extreme than expected by chance: an
extreme issue adjustment has a greater absolute value than all of its permuted counterparts.
We use these to discuss several unique lawmakers.
Using corrected issue adjustments, we identified several of the most-unique lawmakers.
We focused this analysis on votes from 2009-2010, the most recent full session of Congress,
using λ = 1. We fit the variational approximation to all votes in the House and computed
lawmakers’ corrected issue adjustments zˆuk, which are conditioned on their ideal points as
described in Section 5.2. Figure 16 illustrates those issue preferences which were significant
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under 20 permutation replications (p < 0.05) for several lawmakers from this Congress.
• Ron Paul. We return to Ron Paul, one of the most unique House Republicans, and a
lawmaker who first motivated this analysis. Paul’s offsets were very extreme; he tended
to vote more conservatively than expected on health, human rights and international
affairs. He voted more liberally on social issues such as racial and ethnic relations, and
broke with behavior expected under a procedural cartel (congressional sessions). The
issue-adjusted training accuracy of Paul’s votes increased from 83.8% to 87.9% with
issue offsets, placing him among the two most-improved lawmakers with this model.
The issue-adjusted improvement ImpK (Equation 10) when restricted to Paul’s votes
indicate significant improvement in international affairs and East Asia (he tends votes
against U.S. involvement in foreign countries); congressional sessions ; human rights ;
and special months (he tends to vote against recognition of months as special holidays).
• Donald Young. One of the most exceptional legislators in the 111th House was
Donald Young, Alaska Republican. Young stood out most in a topic used frequently
in House bills about naming local landmarks. In many cases, Young voted against the
majority of his party (and the House in general) on a series of largely symbolic bills
and resolutions. For example, in the commemorative events and holidays topic, Young
voted (with only two other Republicans and against the majority of the House) not
to commend “the members of the Agri-business Development Teams of the National
Guard and the National Guard Bureau for their efforts... to modernize agriculture
practices and increase food production in war-torn countries.”
Young’s divergent symbolic voting was also evident in a series of votes against naming
various landmarks—such as post offices—in a topic about such symbolic votes. Yet
Donald Young’s ideal point is -0.35, which is not particularly distinctive (see Figure 2):
using the ideal point alone, we would not recognize his unique voting behavior.
Procedural Cartels. Above we briefly noted that Democrats and Republicans become
more partisan on procedural issues. Lawmakers’ more partisan voting on procedural issues
can be explained by theories about partisan strategy in the House. In this section we
summarize a theory underlying this behavior and note several ways in which it is supported
by issue adjustments.
The sharp contrast in voting patterns between procedural votes and substantive votes
has been noted and studied over the past century (Jr. 1965; Jones 1964; Cox and McCubbins
1993; Cox and Poole 2002). Cox and McCubbins (1993) provide a summary of this behavior:
“parties in the House—especially the majority party—are a species of ’legislative cartel’ [
which usurp the power ] to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation.” A
defining assumption made by Cox and McCubbins (2005) is that the majority party delegates
an agenda-setting monopoly to senior partners in the party, who set the procedural agenda
in the House. As a result, the cartel ensures that senior members hold agenda-setting seats
(such as committee chairs) while rank-and-file members of the party support agenda-setting
decisions.
This procedural cartel theory has withstood tests in which metrics of polarity were found
to be greater on procedural votes than substantive votes (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Cox and
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Poole 2002; Cox and McCubbins 2005). We note that issue adjustments support this theory
in several ways. First, lawmakers’ systematic bias for procedural issues was illustrated and
discussed in Section 5.2 (see Figure 15): Democrats systematically lean left on procedural
issues, while Republicans systematically lean right. Importantly, this discrepancy is more
pronounced among procedural issues than substantive ones. Second, lawmakers’ positions
on procedural issues are more partisan than expected under the underlying un-adjusted ideal
points (see Section 5.2 and Figure 13). Finally, more extreme polarity and improved predic-
tion on procedural votes (see Section 4.3 and Figure 10) indicate that that issue adjustments
for procedural votes are associated with more extreme party affiliation—also observed by
Cox and Poole (2002).
6. SUMMARY
We developed and studied the issue-adjusted ideal point model, a model designed to tease
apart lawmakers’ preferences from their general political position. This is a model of roll-
call data that captures how lawmakers vary, issue by issue. It gives a new way to explore
legislative data. On a large data set of legislative history, we demonstrated that it is able to
represent votes better than a classic ideal point model and illustrated its use as an exploratory
tool.
This work could be extended in several ways. One of the most natural way is to incorpo-
rate lawmakers’ stated positions on issues – which may differ from how they actually vote on
these issues; in preliminary analyses, we have found little correlation to external sources. We
might also study lawmakers’ activities outside of voting to understand their issue positions.
For example, lawmakers’ fund-raising by industry area might (or might not) be useful in
predicting their positions on different issues. Additional work includes modeling how law-
makers’ positions on issues change over time, by incorporating time-series assumptions as in
Martin and Quinn (2002).
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APPENDIX A. POSTERIOR INFERENCE
In this appendix we provide additional details for A Textual Issue Model for Legislative Roll
Calls. We begin by detailing the inference algorithm summarized in Section 3.
A.1. Optimizing the variational objective
Variational bounds are typically optimized by gradient ascent or block coordinate ascent,
iterating through the variational parameters and updating them until the relative increase
in the lower bound is below a specified threshold. Traditionally this would require symbolic
expansion of the ELBO Lη = Eq [p(x, v,z,θ, a, b)− qη(x, v, z, a, b)], so that the bound can
be optimized with respect to the variational parameters η. This expectation cannot be
analytically expanded with our model. One solution would be to approximate this bound.
Especially when there are many variables, however, this approximation and the resulting
optimization algorithm are complicated and prone to bugs.
Instead of expanding this bound symbolically, we update each parameter with stochas-
tic optimization. We repeat these updates for each parameter until the parameters have
converged. Upon convergence, we use the variational means x˜ and z˜ to inspect lawmakers’
issues and bill parameters a˜ and b˜ to inspect items of legislation.
Without loss of generality, we describe how to perform the mth update on the variational
parameter x˜, assuming that we have the most-recent estimates of the variational parameters
x˜n−1, z˜n−1, a˜n−1, and b˜n−1. To motivate the inference algorithm, we first approximate the
ELBO L with a Taylor approximation, which we optimize. At the optimum, the Taylor
approximation is equal to the ELBO.
Writing the variational objective as L(x˜) = KL(qx˜||p) for notational convenience (where
all parameters in η except x˜ are held fixed), we estimate the KL divergence as a function of
x˜ around our last estimate x˜m−1 with its Taylor approximation
L(x˜) ≈L(x˜n−1) +
(
∂L
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)T
∆x˜+
1
2
∆x˜T
(
∂2L
∂x˜∂x˜T
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)
∆x˜, (11)
where ∆x˜ = x˜ − x˜n−1. Once we have estimated the Taylor coefficients (as described in the
next paragraph), we can perform the update
x˜n ← x˜n−1 −
(
∂2L
∂x˜∂x˜T
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)−1(
∂L
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)
. (12)
We approximated the Taylor coefficients with Monte Carlo sampling. Without loss of
generality, we will illustrate this approximation with the variational parameter x˜. Let x˜n−1
be the current estimates of the variational mean, qx˜n−1(x, z, a, b) be the variational posterior
at this mean, and Lx˜n−1 be the ELBO at this mean. We then approximate the gradient with
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Monte Carlo samples as
∂Lx˜
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
=
∂
∂x˜
∫
qx˜(x, z, a, b)(log p(x, z, a, b, v)− log qx˜(x, z, a, b))dxdzdadb
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
(13)
=
∫
∂
∂x˜
(qx˜(x)(log p(x, z, a, b, v)− log qx˜(x, z, a, b))) dx˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
=
∫
qx˜(x)
∂ log qx˜(x)
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
(log p(x, z, a, b, v)− log qx˜(x, z, a, b))dx˜
≈ 1
M
M∑
m=1
((
∂ log qx˜(xn−1,m, zn−1,m, an−1,m, bn−1,m)
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)
× ( log p(xn−1,m, zn−1,m, an−1,m, bn−1,m, v)
− C − log qx˜n−1(xn−1,m, zn−1,m, an−1,m, bn−1,m)
))
,
where we have taken the gradient through the integral using Leibniz’s rule and used M
samples from the current estimate of the variational posterior. The second Taylor coefficient
is straightforward to derive with similar algebra:
∂2L§˜
∂x˜∂x˜T
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
≈ 1
M
M∑
m=1
((
∂ log qn−1(xn−1,m)
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)(
∂ log qm−1(xn−1,m)
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)T
(14)
× ( log p(xn−1,m, zn−1,m, an−1,m, an−1,m, v)
− C − log qx˜n−1(xn−1,m, zn−1,m, an−1,m, bn−1,m)− 1
)
,
+
((
∂2 log qn−1(xn−1,m)
∂x˜∂x˜T
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
)
× ( log p(xn−1,m, zn−1,m, an−1,m, bn−1,m, v)
− C − log qx˜n−1(xn−1,m, zn−1,m, an−1,m, bn−1,m)
)))
,
where we increase M as the model converges. Note that C is a free parameter that we
can set without changing the final solution. We set C to the average of log p(xn−1,m|...) −
log qn−1(xn−1,m) across the set of M samples.
Quasi-Monte Carlo samples. Instead of taking iid samples from the variational distri-
bution qM−1, we used quasi-Monte Carlo sampling Niederreiter (1992). By taking non-iid
samples from qm−1, we are able to decrease the variance around estimates of the Taylor co-
efficients. To select these samples, we took M equally-spaced points from the unit interval,
passed these through the inverse CDF of the variational Gaussian qn−1(x), and used the re-
sulting values as samples. Note that these samples produce a biased estimate of Equation 11.
This bias decreases as N →∞.
When we update the variational parameter x˜u, we do not need to sample all random
variables, but we do need a sample of all random variables in the Markov blanket of xu. The
cumulative distribution is of course ill-defined for multivariate distributions, so the method in
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the last paragraph is not quite enough. For a quasi-Monte Carlo sample from the multivariate
distribution of xu’s Markov blanket, we selected M samples using the method in the previous
paragraph for each marginal in the Markov blanket of xu. We then permuted each variable’s
samples and combined them for M multivariate samples {xn−1,m, . . . , bn−1,m}m from the
current estimate qn−1 of the variational distribution.
Estimating ∂ log qm
∂x
. We estimate the gradients of log q above based on the distribution
of the variational marginals. We have defined the variational distribution to be factorized
Gaussians, so these take the form
∂ log qn−1(xn−1,m)
∂x˜
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
=
xn−1,m − x˜n−1
σ2x
(15)
∂2 log qn−1(xn−1,m)
∂x˜2
∣∣∣
x˜n−1
=− 1
σ2x
.
We finally address practical details of implementing issue-adjusted ideal points.
A.2. Algorithmic parameters.
We fixed the variance σ2x to exp(−5). Allowing σx to vary freely provides a better variational
bound at the expense of accuracy. This happens because the issue-adjusting model would
sometimes fit poor means to some parameters when the posterior variance was large: there
is little penalty for this when the variance is large. Low posterior variance σ2x is similar to a
non-sparse MaP estimate.
These updates were repeated until the exponential moving average ∆est,i ← 0.8∆est,i−1+
0.2∆obs,i of the change in KL divergence dropped below one and the number N of samples
passed 500. If the moving average dropped below one and N < 500, we doubled the number
of samples.
When performing the second-order updates described in Section 3, we skipped variable
updates when the estimated Hessian was not positive definite (this disappeared when sample
sizes grew large enough). We also limited step sizes to 0.1 (another possible reason for smaller
coefficients).
A.3. Hyperparameter settings
The most obvious parameter in the issue voting model is the regularization term λ.
The main parameter in the issue-adjusted model is the regularization λ, which is shared
for all issue adjustments. The Bayesian treatment described in the Inference section of this
paper demonstrated considerable robustness to overfitting at the expense of precision. With
λ = 0.001, for example, issue adjustments zuk remained on the order of single digits, while
experiments with MaP estimates yielded adjustment estimates over 100.
We report the effect of different λ by fitting the issue-adjusted model to the 109th
Congress (1999-2000) of the House and Senate for a range λ = 0.0001, . . . , 1000 of regulariza-
tions. We performed 6-fold cross-validation, holding out one sixth of votes in each fold, and
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109th U.S. Senate sensitivity to λ
Model Lambda
1e-4 1e-3 1e-2 1e-1 1 10 100 1000
Ideal -0.188 -0.189 -0.189 -0.189 -0.189 -0.190 -0.189 -0.189
Issue (LDA) -0.191 -0.191 -0.188 -0.186 -0.188 -0.189 -0.189 0.198
Permuted Issue -0.242 -0.245 -0.231 -0.221 -0.204 -0.208 -0.208 -0.208
109th U.S. House sensitivity to λ
Model Lambda
1e-4 1e-3 1e-2 1e-1 1 10 100 1000
Ideal -0.119 -0.119 -0.119 -0.119 -0.120 -0.119 -0.119 -0.119
Issue (LDA) -0.159 -0.159 -0.158 -0.139 -0.118 -0.119 -0.119 0.119
Permuted Issue -0.191 -0.192 -0.189 -0.161 -0.122 -0.120 -0.120 -0.120
Figure A.1: Average log-likelihood of heldout votes by regularization λ. Log-likelihood
was averaged across folds using six-fold cross validation for Congress 109 (2005-2006). The
variational distribution represented votes with higher heldout log-likelihood than traditional
ideal points for 1 ≤ λ ≤ 10. In a model fit with permuted issue labels (Perm. Issue), heldout
likelihood of votes was worse than traditional ideal points for all regularizations λ.
calculated average log-likelihood
∑
vud∈Vheldout log p(vud|x˜u, z˜u, a˜d, b˜d) for votes Vheldout in the
heldout set. Following the algorithm described in Section 3, we began with M = 21 samples
to estimate the approximate gradient (Equation 11) and scaled it by 1.2 each time the Elbo
dropped below a threshold, until it was 500. We also fixed variance σ2x, σ
2
z , σ
2
a, σ
2
b = exp(−5).
We summarize these results in Table A.1.
The variational implementation generalized well for the entire range, representing votes
best in the range 1 ≤ λ ≤ 10. Log-likelihood dropped modestly for λ < 1. In the worst
case, log-likelihood was -0.159 in the House (this corresponds with 96% heldout accuracy)
and -0.242 in the Senate (93% heldout accuracy).
We recommend a modest value of λ = 1, and no greater than λ = 10. At this value, the
model outperforms ideal points in validation experiments on both the House and Senate, for
a range of Congresses.
APPENDIX B. CORPUS PREPARATION
B.1. Issue labels
In the empirical analysis, we used issue labels obtained from the Congressional Research
Service. There were 5, 861 labels, ranging from World Wide Web to Age. We only used issue
labels which were applied to at least twenty five bills in the 12 years under consideration.
This filter resulted in seventy-four labels which correspond fairly well to political issues.
These issues, and the number of documents each label was applied to, is given in Table B.2.
B.2. Vocabulary selection
In this section we provide further details of vocabulary selection.
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Figure B.2: Issue labels and the number of documents with each label (as assigned by the
Congressional Research Service) for Congresses 106 to 111 (1999 to 2010).
Issue label No.
bills
Women 25
Military history 25
Civil rights 25
Government buildings; facilities; and
property
26
Terrorism 26
Energy 26
Crime and law enforcement 27
Congressional sessions 27
East Asia 28
Appropriations 28
Business 29
Congressional reporting requirements 30
Congressional oversight 30
Special weeks 31
Social services 31
Health 33
Special days 33
California 33
Social work; volunteer service; chari-
table organizations
33
State and local government 34
Civil liberties 35
Government information and archives 35
Presidents 35
Government employees 35
Executive departments 35
Racial and ethnic relations 36
Sports and recreation 36
Labor 36
Special months 39
Children 40
Veterans 40
Human rights 41
Finance 41
Religion 42
Politics and government 43
Minorities 44
Public lands and natural resources 44
Issue label No.
bills
Europe 44
Military personnel and dependents 44
Taxation 47
Government operations and politics 47
Postal facilities 47
Medicine 48
Transportation 48
Emergency management 48
Sports 52
Families 53
Medical care 54
Athletes 56
Land transfers 56
Armed forces and national security 56
Natural resources 58
Law 60
History 61
Names 62
Criminal justice 62
Communications 65
Public lands 68
Legislative rules and procedure 69
Elementary and secondary education 74
Anniversaries 82
Armed forces 83
Defense policy 92
Higher education 103
Foreign policy 104
International affairs 105
Budgets 112
Education 122
House of Representatives 142
Commemorative events and holidays 195
House rules and procedure 329
Commemorations 400
Congressional tributes 541
Congress 693
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We first converted the words in each bill to a canonical form using the Tree-tagger part-
of-speech tagger (Schmid 1994). Next we counted all phrases with one to five words. From
these, we immediately eliminated phrases which occurred in more than 10% of bills or in
fewer than 4 bills, or which occurred as fewer than 0.001% of all phrases. This resulted in a
list of 40603 phrases (called n-grams in natural language processing).
We then used a set of features characterizing each word to classify whether it was good
or bad to use in the vocabulary. Some of these features were based on corpus statistics, such
as the number of bills in which a word appeared. Other features used external data sources,
including whether, and how frequently, a word appeared as link text in a Wikipedia article.
We estimated weights for these features using a logistic regression classifier. To train this
classifier, we used a manually curated list of 458 “bad” phrases which were semantically awk-
ward or meaningless (such as the follow bill, and sec amend, to a study, and pr). These were
selected as as negative examples in a L2-penalized logistic regression, while the remaining
words we considered “good” words. We illustrate weights for these features in Figure B.3.
The best 5,000 phrases under this model were used in the vocabulary.
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Coefficient Summary Weight
log(count + 1) Frequency of phrase in corpus -0.018
log(number.docs + 1) Number of bills containing phrase 0.793
anchortext.presentTRUE Occurs as anchortext in Wikipedia 1.730
anchortext Frequency of appearing as anchortext in
Wikipedia
1.752
frequency.sum.div.number.docs Frequency divided by number of bills -0.007
doc.sq Number of bills containing phrase,
squared
-0.294
has.secTRUE Contains the phrase sec -0.469
has.parTRUE Contains the phrase paragra -0.375
has.strikTRUE Contains the phrase strik -0.937
has.amendTRUE Contains the phrase amend -0.484
has.insTRUE Contains the phrase insert -0.727
has.clauseTRUE Contains the phrase clause -0.268
has.provisionTRUE Contains the phrase provision -0.432
has.titleTRUE Contains the phrase title -0.841
test.pos ln(max(−test, 0) + 1) 0.091
test.zeroTRUE 1 if test = 0 -1.623
test.neg ln(max(test, 0) + 1) 0.060
number.terms1 Number of terms in phrase is 1 -1.623
number.terms2 Number of terms in phrase is 2 2.241
number.terms3 Number of terms in phrase is 3 0.315
number.terms4 Number of terms in phrase is 4 -0.478
number.terms5 Number of terms in phrase is 5 -0.454
log(number.docs + 1) * anchortext ln(Number of bills containing phrase)
×1{Appears in Wikipedia anchortext}
-0.118
log(count + 1) * log(number.docs +
1)
ln(Number of bills containing phrase + 1)
× ln(Frequency of phrase in corpus + 1)
0.246
Figure B.3: Features and coefficients used for predicting “good” phrases. Below, test is a test
statistic which measures deviation from a model assuming that words appear independently;
large values indicate that they occur more often than expected by chance. We define it as
test =
Observed count−Expected count√
Expected count under a language model assuming independence
.
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